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Summary: In European Union law, the existence of an effective rem-
edy to challenge EU actions has been at the core of a heated ongo-
ing debate, since individual applicants and NGOs often have a hard 
time obtaining locus standi in annulment proceedings, due to the 
restrictive interpretation given by the European Court of Justice to the 
standing requirements provided by (the former) Article 230(4) of the EC 
Treaty. The aim of this paper is to show how access to justice before the 
EU courts for environmental NGOs has been significantly curtailed up 
to the present, and to discuss the changes to the standing test brought 
by the Lisbon Treaty by analysing its content and the (to date) limited 
interpretation given by the European Courts to the term ‘regulatory 
act’ introduced by the Treaty. On the basis of this examination, it will 
be shown how the recent amendments have not changed the position 
of NGOs who wish to challenge EU environmental measures and 
how, therefore, a significant gap in judicial protection and a potential 
violation of Articles 9(2) and (3) of the Aarhus Convention still remain.
‘[P]rovisions of the Treaty regarding the right of action 
of interested parties must not be interpreted restricti-
vely … the Treaty being silent on this point, a limitation 
in this respect may not be presumed.’1
1. Introduction
The right to an effective legal remedy is a generally accepted princi-
ple of modern legal systems and is enshrined in national constitutions 
as well as international treaties, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.2
* Assistant Professor of European Administrative Law and Academic Director of European 
Law School (English Language Track), Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, Maas-
tricht University.
1 The author of this quotation will be revealed at the end of the paper.
2 Arts 6 and 13 ECHR.
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At the EU level, the right to an effective remedy is laid down in Ar-
ticle 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.3 In 
European Union law, the existence of an effective remedy to challenge EU 
actions has been at the core of a heated ongoing debate,4 since individual 
applicants and NGOs often have a hard time obtaining locus standi in 
annulment proceedings. In particular, this is due to the restrictive inter-
pretation given by the European Court of Justice to the standing require-
ments provided by (the former) Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty.
Consequently, many have argued that the right to an effective re-
medy against EU actions is not guaranteed in a sufficient way in the EU 
legal order.5
With specific regard to the challenge of EU environmental measures, 
one must also take the provisions of the Aarhus Convention into account. 
This international instrument was adopted by the European Commu-
nity on 17 February 2005 by Decision 2005/370/EC6 and provides, in 
3 Article 47 of the Charter stipulates that ‘everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’.
4 For criticism on the standing requirements of individual applicants under Article 230 
EC, see, ex multis, A Ward, ‘Locus Standi under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty: Crafting a 
Coherent Test for a Wobbly Polity’ [2003] 22Yearbook of European Law 45; A Arnull, ‘Private 
Applicants and the Action for Annulment since Codorniu’ [2001] 38 CML Rev 7; JM Martin 
Cortés, ‘Ubi ius, ibi Remedium? Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230(4) EC 
at a European Constitutional Crossroads’ [2004] 11Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law233; A Ward, ‘Amsterdam and Amendment to Article 230: An Opportu-
nity Lost or Simply Deferred?’ in A Dashwood and A Johnston, The Future of the Judicial 
System of the European Union (Hart Publishing 2001) 37; A Abaquense de Parfouru, ‘Locus 
Standi of Private Applicants under the Article 230 EC Action for Annulment: Any Lessons 
to be Learnt from France?’ [2007] 14Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
361; A Cygan, ‘Protecting the Interests of Civil Society in Community Decision-making: The 
Limits of Article 230 EC’ [2003] 52International and Comparative Law Quarterly 995; X 
Lewis, ‘Standing of Private Plaintiffs to Annul Generally Applicable European Community 
Measures: If the System is Broken, where Should it be Fixed?’[2006-2007] 30 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1496. Specifically with regard to environmental policy, see for 
instance B Dette, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: A Fundamental Democratic 
Right’ in M Onida, Europe and the Environment. Legal Essays in Honour of Ludwig Krämer 
(Europa Law Publishing 2004) 1.
5 J Usher, ‘Direct and Individual Concern: An Effective Remedy or a Conventional Soluti-
on?’[2005]28 ELR 575; F Ragolle, ‘Access to Justice for Private Applicants in the Community 
Legal Order: Recent (R)evolutions’ [2003] 28ELR90; A Albor-Llorens, ‘The Standing of Pri-
vate Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the European Court Missed the Boat?’ 
[2003] 62 CLJ 72. Specifically with regard to environmental policy, see N Gérard, ‘Access 
to Justice on Environmental Matters: A Case of Double Standards?’ [1996] 140Journal 
of Environmental Law149; F Berrod, ‘Comment to Greenpeace’ [1999] 36 CML Rev635; N 
Gérard, ‘Access to the European Court of Justice: A Lost Opportunity’ [1998] 10 Journal of 
Environmental Law 338; DL Torrens, ‘Locus Standi for Environmental Associations under 
EC Law - Greenpeace - A Missed Opportunity for the ECJ’ [1999] 8Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law336.
6 Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the 
European Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L 124/1.
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Article 9(2), that the contracting parties should ensure that members of 
the public having a sufficient interest or maintaining impairment of a 
right (where the administrative procedural law of a party requires this as 
a precondition) have access to a review procedure to challenge the sub-
stantive and procedural legality of decisions concerning activities subject 
to the public participation requirements of Article 6 of the Convention 
itself. Furthermore, Article 9(3) provides for the obligation of the parties 
to provide wide access for members of the public to review procedures to 
challenge the legality of decisions affecting the environment. 
To apply the provisions of the Aarhus Convention to EU institutions 
and bodies, the European Community adopted Regulation No 1367/2006 
(the Aarhus Regulation).7Specifically with regard to non-governmental or-
ganisations, the Regulation allows those organisations which fulfil cer-
tain requirements8 to institute proceedings before the European Courts 
against the acts of EU institutions and the decisions of EU bodies. Howe-
ver, it expressly states that NGOs may do so only ‘in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the EC Treaty’ (Article 12(1)).9
The aim of this paper is to show how access to justice before the EU 
courts for environmental NGOs has been significantly curtailed up to the 
present, and to discuss the changes to the standing test brought by the 
Lisbon Treaty by analysing its content and the (to date) limited interpre-
tation given by the European Courts to the term ‘regulatory act’ introdu-
ced by the Treaty. On the basis of this examination, it will be shown how 
the recent amendments have not changed the position of NGOs who wish 
to challenge EU environmental measures and how, therefore, a signifi-
cant gap in judicial protection and a potential violation of Articles 9(2) 
and (3) of the Aarhus Convention still remain.
2. The limited standing of environmental NGOs before the European 
courts
The action for annulment provided for in Article 263 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TEFU) (formerly in Article 230 of 
7 Regulation 1367/2006/EC of 25 September 2006 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to In-
formation, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies [2006] OJ L 264/13. The Regulation entered 
into force on 28 September 2006 and started to apply from 17 July 2007.
8 Article 11 provides for certain criteria which must be fulfilled for NGOs to initiate an 
internal review procedure and action for annulment before the EU courts.
9 For a quite harsh criticism of this instrument, see J Jans, ‘Did Baron von Munchhausen 
ever Visit Aarhus? Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal for a Regulation on the Applicati-
on of the Provisions of the Aarhus Convention to EC Institutions and Bodies’ in R Macrory, 
Reflections on 30 Years of EU Environmental Law: A High Level of Protection? (Europa Law 
Publishing 2006) 474.
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the EC Treaty) is the main mechanism for the judicial review of EU acts. 
This article provides that a natural or legal person may bring an action 
for annulment only in certain specific circumstances, namely in cases of 
challenges against ‘decisions addressed to that person or against a deci-
sion which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed 
to another person, is of direct and individual concern’ to the applicant. 
The first requirement, direct concern, is relatively straightforward 
compared to the requirement of individual concern.10The ECJ has con-
sistently found that a measure will be of direct concern to the applicant 
when the latter’s legal position has been directly adversely affected. In 
other words, there must be a direct link between the challenged measure 
and the loss or damage that the applicant has suffered.11 Furthermore, 
the Court will, with a high likelihood, deem a causation chain to be bro-
ken if the contested EU measure leaves any discretion to the addressees 
of the measure who are responsible for its implementation.12
The second requirement is more problematic. The ECJ laid down its 
view on the requirement of individual concern in the Plaumann case,13 
where the Court found that:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only 
claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by re-
ason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons 
and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as 
in the case of the person addressed. (emphasis added)
This landmark case thus set the threshold for admitting individual 
applicants very high by restricting the locus standi only to those per-
sons who differentiate themselves from all other persons.14 In applying 
the Plaumann test, the Court has allowed standing to applicants only in 
10 Albor-Llorens correctly notes that the lower profile of the test of direct concern is due to 
the fact that the ECJ has been less rigid and more consistent in the interpretation of this 
concept. Furthermore, since the tests of individual and direct concern are cumulative, the 
Court has frequently denied standing to private applicants on the grounds of lack of indivi-
dual concern, without even considering the requirement of direct concern. Albor-Llorens (n 
5) 75.
11 Cases 41-44/70 International Fruit Company BV v Commission [1971] ECR 411. In this 
case, employees of a merging company were not granted locus standi to challenge a Commi-
ssion decision allowing the merger, due to the fact that possible employment terminations 
would not be the direct consequence of the Commission decision.
12 See, for example, Case69/69 Alcan Aluminium Raeren v Commission[1970]ECR 385 
andCase222/83 Municipality of Differdange v Commission[1984]ECR 2889.
13 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95.
14 When applied to the facts of the Plaumann case, this meant that, although the company 
in question was actually among the few companies importing clementines into the Commu-
nity area, any person could potentially engage in such a business activity. Hence, the Court 
found that Plaumann was not individually concerned.
73CYELP 7 [2011] 69-85
exceptional circumstances, namely, where the applicant can show that 
it belongs to a so-called ‘closed class’ which is differently affected by the 
challenged measure compared to all other natural or legal persons.15
More specifically with regard to environmental NGOs, the Plaumann 
jurisprudence was asserted for the first time in the Stichting Greenpeace 
Council case.16 In this case, the Court of First Instance (CFI) held that 
the Plaumann test ‘remains applicable whatever the nature, economic or 
otherwise, of those of the applicants’ interests which are affected’17 and 
did not set up an exception for environmental matters. By applying the 
Plaumann test, the CFI concluded that, since the applicant association 
did not ‘adduce any special circumstances to demonstrate the individu-
al interest of their members as opposed to any other person residing in 
those areas’18 and, therefore, ‘[T]he possible effect on the legal position 
of the members of the applicant associations cannot … be any different 
from that alleged here by the applicants who are private individuals’,19 
standing had to be refused. 
On appeal, the ECJ confirmed the judgment of the CFI in applying 
the Plaumann test.20 In particular, the ECJ was not convinced by the 
appellants’ plea that:
by applying the case-law developed by the Court of Justice in rela-
tion to economic issues and economic rights, according to which an 
individual must belong to a ‘closed class’ in order to be individually 
concerned by a Community act, the Court of First Instance failed to 
take account of the nature and specific character of the environmen-
tal interests underpinning their action.21
15 For example, in a case concerning seven Greek cotton traders who sought a judicial review 
of a Commission decision that authorised France to impose a fixed-term quota on cotton yarn 
imports from Greece to France, the Court found that pre-existing import contracts differentia-
ted the applicant from potential importers and thus granted standing to the applicants. See 
Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki v Commission [1985] ECR 207. The ‘closed class’ test has attrac-
ted much criticism because of its formalistic and artificial nature. See, for example, A Arnull, 
‘Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty’ [1995] 
32CML Rev7, 44-49. For a thorough review of the case law, see Arnull (n 4).
16 Case T-585/93 Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v 
Commission [1995] ECR II-2205. In this case, Greenpeace International, together with local 
associations and residents in Gran Canaria, were seeking the annulment of a decision 
adopted by the European Commission to disburse to the Kingdom of Spain a certain sum 
by way of financial assistance provided by the European Regional Development Fund for the 
construction of two power stations in the Canary Islands without first requiring or carrying 
out an environmental impact assessment.
17 Stichting Greenpeace Council (n 16) para 50.
18 Stichting Greenpeace Council (n 16) para 60.
19 Stichting Greenpeace Council (n 16) para 60.
20 Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v 
Commission [1998] ECR I-1651.
21 Stichting Greenpeace Council (n 20) para 17.
74 Mariolina Eliantonio: Towards an Ever Dirtier Europe? The Restrictive Standing...
The CFI confirmed its position in the EEB and Stichting Natuur en 
Milieu case.22 In this case, the EEB, a federation of over 145 environmental 
citizens’ organisations based in the 27 EU Member States, and Stichting 
Natuur en Milieu (SNM) sought the annulment of certain provisions of two 
decisions of the European Commission which allowed the Member States 
to maintain in force authorisations for the use of two herbicide products 
with potential negative effects on the environment and human health.
The CFI reasserted the Plaumann jurisprudence and considered 
that the European Commission’s decisions affected the applicants in the 
same manner as any other person in the same situation, and that the fact 
that their purpose was the protection of the environment and the conser-
vation of nature did not establish that they were individually concerned 
by the decisions. It also held that the special consultative status of the 
EEB and SNM with the European institutions did not support the finding 
that they were individually concerned by the contested decisions, as the 
Community legislation applicable to the adoption of the said decisions 
did not provide for any procedural guarantee for the applicants. This case 
was not appealed to the ECJ.
The EEB case is important for two reasons. First of all, when the 
Court adopted its judgment, the Aarhus Convention was already in force 
in the European Community. The second reason is that the CFI refused 
to grant NGOs access to justice, since it considered that the proposal for 
the regulation that was to apply the provisions of the Aarhus Convention 
to the EC institutions and bodies (ie the Aarhus Regulation mentioned 
above) did not grant standing to environmental NGOs unless the latter 
met the ‘individual concern’ criterion as set out in Article 230 paragraph 
4 of the EC Treaty.
After the entry into force of the Aarhus Regulation, the CFI did not 
change its jurisprudence and instead reasserted it forcefully in the WWF-
UK case.23 In this case, WWF-UK, an environmental NGO, sought the 
annulment in part of a Council regulation fixing the fishing opportunities 
for certain fish stocks applicable in Community waters. The CFI once 
again concluded that WWF-UK was not individually concerned by the 
contested regulation in reasserting the Plaumann jurisprudence and dis-
missed the action. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to point 
out that the CFI stated that:
[A]ny entitlements which the applicant may derive from the Aarhus 
Convention and from Regulation No 1367/2006 [ie the Aarhus Re-
gulation] are granted to it in its capacity as a member of the public. 
22 Joined Cases T-236/04 and T-241/04 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and 
Stichting Natuur en Milieu v Commission [2005] ECR II-04945.
23 Case T-91/07 WWF-UK Ltd v Council [2008] ECR II-81.
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Such entitlements cannot therefore be such as to differentiate the 
applicant from all other persons within the meaning of [the Plau-
mann jurisprudence].24
The Court thus applied the Plaumann test in the same way as it had 
done before, notwithstanding the approval of the Aarhus Convention by 
the European Community and the adoption of the Aarhus Regulation. 
Moreover, as in the EEB case, neither the statutory aim of the applicant 
NGO to protect the environment, nor its special status allowing it to par-
ticipate in the decision-making process of the contested regulation were 
criteria considered by the Court as giving the right to challenge the con-
tested regulation.
On appeal,25 the ECJ confirmed the CFI’s position and, in order to 
support its argument, made a distinction between substance and proce-
dure, which cannot be found in the CFI’s ruling. In particular, the ECJ 
agreed on the fact that if a person is involved in the procedure leading to 
the adoption of a Community measure, this person is capable of distin-
guishing him/herself individually in relation to the measure in question 
if the applicable Community legislation grants him certain procedural 
guarantees. However, that person enjoying such a procedural right will, 
in the ECJ’s view, not have standing to bring proceedings contesting the 
legality of a Community act in terms of its substantive content.
According to the ECJ, the applicant association had the right to be 
heard by the Commission prior to the adoption of the contested Commu-
nity measure. However, there was no obligation for the Community legi-
slature to implement the proposals made in the recommendations. From 
this distinction, the ECJ derived the conclusion that the existence of 
a procedural guarantee before the Community judicature did not imply 
that the action was admissible, as it was based on pleas alleging the in-
fringement of substantive rules of law.
The CFI confirmed this restrictive position in the Autonomous Re-
gion of the Azores case,26 in which the Autonomous Region sought the 
annulment in part of a regulation on the management of the fishing effort 
relating to Community fishing areas and resources. Three environmental 
associations, Seas at Risk, the WWF and Stichting Greenpeace Council 
sought leave to intervene in the case in support of the applicant.
In reply to the arguments of the applicant that Article 230(4) EC sho-
uld be interpreted in such a way as to render it compatible with Article 
9 of the Aarhus Convention, the Court held that the Convention had not 
24 WWF-UK Ltd (n 23) para 82.
25 Case C-355/08 P, WWF-UK v Council [2009] ECR I-73.
26 Case T-37/04 Região Autónoma dos Açores v Council [2008] ECR II-103.
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been approved by the Community when the action was brought. In addi-
tion, it recalled that Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention refers expressly to 
‘the criteria, if any, laid down in [the] national law’ of the contracting par-
ties, and that those criteria were laid down, with regard to actions brou-
ght before the Community judicature, in Article 230 EC. Upon this basis, 
the Court dismissed the action, as it considered the applicant not to be 
individually concerned by the contested act under Article 230(4) EC.
The Court acknowledged that the Aarhus Regulation allows certain 
NGOs to bring an action for annulment before the Community judicatu-
re. However, the Court considered that the conditions laid down in the 
regulation were not satisfied in the present case, but did not give any 
explanation and further deemed that ‘it is not for the Court to substitute 
itself for the legislature and to accept, on the basis of the Aarhus Con-
vention, the admissibility of an action which does not meet the conditions 
laid down in Article 230 EC’.27 The case was appealed to the ECJ, which 
dismissed the appeal without further discussing any point concerning 
the Aarhus Convention.28
3. The case law of the European Courts and the Aarhus Convention
The analysis of the relevant case law shows that, in reasserting the 
Plaumann jurisprudence in all cases concerning environmental matters, 
the European Courts have firmly refused to allow environmental NGOs to 
challenge decisions of EU institutions. In fact, the European Courts (the 
Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice) have interpre-
ted the individual concern criterion so narrowly (and, one could argue, 
somewhat paradoxically)29 that environmental NGOs have in every case 
been refused standing to challenge EU institutions’ decisions, exempting 
essentially these decisions from judicial scrutiny.
Apart from the Greenpeace rulings, all the rulings examined above 
were rendered after the adoption of the Aarhus Convention by the EC. 
When the WWF-UK and Autonomous Region of the Azores judgments were 
rendered, not only was the Convention in force, but the Aarhus Regulation 
had been adopted. It should be noted, however, that WWF-UK is the only 
case initiated after the entry in force of the Aarhus Convention in the Euro-
pean Community, and that to date no ruling has been rendered in a case 
which was initiated after the entry into force of the Aarhus Regulation.
27 Região Autónoma dos Açores (n 26) para 93.
28 Case C-444/08 Região Autónoma dos Açores v Council [2009] ECR I-200.
29 The application of the Plaumann test to environmental measures has the perverse effect 
that the higher the number of individuals affected by EU measures (and hence, one could 
argue, the more potentially dangerous the EU measure is), the less chance there will be that 
standing will be granted.
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When the Court adopted its judgment in the EEB case, the Aarhus 
Convention was in force in the European Community. However, as it had 
not been in force when the action was initiated, the Court could not apply 
it. However, the Court could have been guided by the provisions and the 
spirit of the Convention to reconsider the standing rules and widen the 
access to justice for members of the public in the light of Article 9 of the 
Aarhus Convention.
The same could be argued with regard to the Autonomous Region of 
the Azores case, which was also rendered when the Aarhus Regulation was 
in force. In this case, the CFI recognised that the Community legislature 
adopted the Aarhus Regulation ‘in order to facilitate access to the Commu-
nity judicature in environmental matters’,30 and that the Regulation ‘lays 
down a procedure on completion of which certain NGOs may bring an 
action for annulment before the Community judicature under Article 230 
EC’.31 However, the reference to the condition ‘under Article 230 EC’ and 
the CFI’s indication that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention mentions 
‘the criteria, if any, laid down in national law’ removed any possibility of an 
action for annulment. The CFI, indeed, considered that by the ‘criteria laid 
down in national law’, the interpretation of ‘individual concern’ must also 
be included, to the effect that only the legislature could decide that Article 
230 EC should be interpreted differently or could amend it.
In taking this position, however, the CFI did not acknowledge the 
findings and recommendations of the Compliance Committee of the Aar-
hus Convention concerning the Belgian Council of State, in which it sta-
ted that:
the Parties may not take the clause ‘where they meet the criteria, if 
any, laid down in its national law’ as an excuse for introducing or 
maintaining so strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost all 
environmental organisations from challenging acts or omissions that 
contravene national law relating to the environment.32
The position of the CFI, therefore, cannot be accepted since it appe-
ars from all the case law cited that the criteria imposed by it are so strict 
that they bar all environmental organisations from challenging acts that 
are not in compliance with European law relating to the environment.
From the perspective of compliance with the Aarhus Convention, 
the outcome of the WWF-UK case is even more worrying, because it de-
30 Case C-444/08 Região Autónoma dos Açores (n 28) para 93.
31 Case C-444/08 Região Autónoma dos Açores (n 28) para 93.
32 Findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Compliance Committee with regard to 
compliance by Belgium with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention in relation to the 
rights of environmental organisations to have access to justice, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/4/
Add.2, 28 July 2006 (para 35).
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monstrates that the CFI and the ECJ continued to apply the Plaumann 
test notwithstanding the fact that the case was initiated after the entry 
into force of the Aarhus Convention. According to Article 9(2) of the Aar-
hus Convention, members of the public concerned do not have to have a 
special consultative status, as WWF-UK had, to have standing in order 
to challenge a decision: they must either have a sufficient interest or 
maintain an impairment of a right. It could be argued that because of its 
statutory aim and special position in the decision-making leading to the 
adoption of the measure it was challenging, WWF-UK had a sufficient 
interest.
The decision of the CFI is, therefore, not in compliance with Article 
9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, which provides that:
what constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall 
be determined in accordance with the requirements of national law 
and consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned 
wide access to justice.
The same can be argued with regard to the ECJ’s ruling in the appeal 
case. Here the ECJ seemed to acknowledge that an environmental NGO 
which is involved in a consultative status in the process of the decision-
making leading to the adoption of an EC measure could be regarded as 
having individual concern. However, the ECJ specified that, in that case, 
the NGO would be regarded as having individual concern only with regard 
to procedural failures and not with regard to the legality of the measure 
in terms of its substantive content. While this ruling could be regarded 
as opening the door to environmental NGOs, one immediately sees how 
this concession is merely formal. The only consequence it could have is 
to admit a challenge on procedural grounds (eg lack of consultation of an 
NGO which should have been consulted), but it would never provide the 
basis for a substantive challenge to an EU environmental measure.
This position is at odds with Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, 
which prescribes access to justice for members of the public concerned to 
challenge the substantive and procedural legality of a decision affecting 
the environment.
In general, it can be concluded that the European Courts seem to 
have ignored the requirements mandated by the Convention, since they 
have interpreted the criteria laid down in Article 230 EC so strictly that 
they bar all environmental organisations from challenging acts relating 
to the environment which are not in compliance with European law. This 
interpretation by the European Courts of the requirement of individual 
concern provided for in Article 230 EC does not seem to comply with the 
requirements of Article 9(2) and (3) of the Aarhus Convention, since the 
consequences of applying the Plaumann test to environmental and health 
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issues is that in effect no NGO is ever able to challenge an environmental 
measure before the European Courts.
It is worth noting that the ECJ has on several occasions justified this 
restrictive approach to the standing of private applicants in annulment 
actions by referring to the idea of a ‘complete system of remedies’ created 
by the EC Treaty.33 In the ECJ’s view, this system is complete because 
an EU measure may be challenged either through a direct action under 
the former Article 230 EC (now Article 263 TFEU) or through the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure pursuant to the former Article 234 EC (now Article 
267 TFEU). Hence, according to the ECJ, a restrictive interpretation of 
‘individual concern’ does not create a gap in judicial protection, because 
individuals have the option to bring actions against the national imple-
mentation measures of EU measures before the national courts, which 
creates the obligation, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and the ECJ’s ruling 
in Foto-Frost,34 to refer questions of validity of EU measures to the ECJ.35 
However, for all the reasons highlighted by AG Jacobs in the UPA case,36 
an indirect challenge to EU measures at the national level may not be 
regarded as an adequate substitute for a direct action before the Europe-
an judicature, and may result in a complete denial of a remedy or in the 
denial of an effective remedy.37
The first situation arises when the contested EU measure does not 
require any implementing act at the national level. In this situation, the 
only way for the applicants to have access to a court would be to violate 
the rules laid down in the contested EU measure and rely on the invali-
dity of this measure in domestic proceedings. It has been considered that 
this option is theoretically possible, but cannot be sustained in a Union 
based on the rule of law.38 As AG Jacobs put it, individuals ‘cannot be 
required to breach the law in order to gain access to justice’.39 Hence, in 
such situations, the ECJ’s reliance on the preliminary ruling proceedings 
would result in a complete lack of judicial protection.
33  Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. 
34 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199.
35 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677.
36 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, Opinion of 
AG Jacobs.
37 C Koch, ‘Locus Standi of Private Applicants under the EU Constitution: Preserving Gaps 
in the Protection of Individuals ’Right to an Effective Remedy’ [2005] 30 EL Rev 511, 515. 
38 Koch (n 37) 515; Ragolle (n 5) 91;Albor-Llorens (n 5) 87.
39 Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 36) para 43. The dilemma for individuals in such situations is 
explained by Corthaut: ‘either [the individual] obeys the regulation in spite of her doubts as 
to its validity – which may result in unnecessary losses – or she may choose to violate the re-
gulation and hope that her hunch about its invalidity proves correct – if so, she walks free, 
otherwise little can save her from potentially severe punishment’ in T Corthaut, ‘Comment 
on Jégo-Quéré’ [2002-2003] 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 141, 143. This situation 
is what prompted the CFI to relax the test of standing in the Jégo-Quéré case and declare 
the action admissible.
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The second situation arises when applicants are able to gain access 
to national courts. For such situations, in the ECJ’s view, ‘it is for the 
Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures 
which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection’.40
However, several problems can be observed with regard to the ECJ’s 
reliance on national courts as a correct forum for cases in which the vali-
dity of EU legislation is in question, such as the fact that the preliminary 
reference procedure is not available to applicants as a matter of right, 
since national courts (with the exclusion of courts of last instance) may 
refuse to refer a question of validity of an EU measure to the ECJ or might 
err in their assessment of the validity of an EU measure and decline to 
refer a question to the ECJ on that basis. In addition, even where a refe-
rence is made, the preliminary questions are formulated by the national 
courts, with the consequence that applicants’ claims might be redefined 
or that the questions referred might limit the range of measures who-
se validity is being challenged before the national court.41 Furthermore, 
proceedings brought before a national court are more disadvantageous 
for individuals compared to an action for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU, since they involve delays and extra costs. 
Hence, the argument of the alleged completeness of systems of re-
medies is not sufficient to escape a violation of Article 9(2) and (3) of the 
Aarhus Convention.
The question is then whether the recognition of a broader standing 
for applicants would require a Treaty amendment. Despite the CFI’s opi-
nion to the contrary in the Autonomous Region of the Azores case, it can 
be argued that another interpretation of the criteria laid down in Article 
263(4) TFEU is definitely possible and, in fact, required. Nothing in Article 
263 suggests that if an applicant is to prove individual concern vis-à-vis a 
measure of general application, then the person needs to prove that he is 
differentiated from all other persons in the same way as an addressee. In 
other words, the Plaumann formula is not contained in the Treaties, but 
is the European Courts’ interpretation of the phrase ‘individual concern’. 
The phrase itself cannot be altered by the ECJ, but changing the inter-
pretation given to it is not something that needs to be left to the Member 
States, but is the Court’s responsibility.42
40 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (n 35) para 41.
41 Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 36) para 42.
42 The ECJ has also used the same ‘passing the hot potato back to the Member States’ tech-
nique in the UPA case, for which it has been criticised by several scholars. See D Chalmers 
and G Monti European Union Law (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2006) 433; Ragolle 
(n 5) 100; T Tridimas and S Poli, ‘Locus Standi of Individuals under Article 230(4): the Re-
turn of Euridice?’ in T Tridimas and S Poli, Making Community Law: The Legacy of Advocate 
General Francis Jacobs at the European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing 2008) 77, 
81CYELP 7 [2011] 69-85
4. The changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty and the (non-existent) 
implications for environmental NGOs
The Treaty of Lisbon modified the standing requirements for non-pri-
vileged applicants, thereby dispensing with the need to show individual 
concern in relation to a regulatory act that does not entail implementing 
measures. In particular, according to Article 263(4) TFEU:
[A]ny natural or legal person may … institute proceedings against an 
act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual con-
cern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern 
to them and does not entail implementing measures.
From an examination of this provision it seems clear that the basic 
policy underlying the system of judicial review has not been changed: 
individuals wishing to challenge acts that are not addressed to them still 
have to prove individual and direct concern.43 The relaxation of the stan-
ding rules will only apply to situations in which two requirements are 
met: first, when the measure under challenge is a regulatory act, and 
second, when the measure in question does not entail implementing me-
asures.
These changes, however, have not had the effect of bringing the EU 
into compliance with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention, and 
the added wording does not significantly change the present situation for 
environmental NGOs.
In order to assess the potential impact of this change, the meaning 
of the phrase ‘regulatory act’ must be explained first. The phrase ‘regu-
latory act’ is, like the amendment itself, a leftover from the Constitutio-
nal Treaty,44 although no definition of a ‘regulatory act’ can be found in 
either the Constitutional Treaty or the Treaty of Lisbon.45 However, in the 
light of the distinction made between legislative acts46 and non-legislative 
81; Albor-Llorens (n 5), 90; Abaquense (n 4)387. On this point and specifically with regard 
to the compliance by the EU with its obligations stemming from the Aarhus Convention, see 
M Pallemaerts, ‘Compliance by the European Community with its Obligations on Access to 
Justice as a Party to the Aarhus Convention’(Institute for European Environmental Policy, 
2009) 41.
43 Lewis (n 4) 1532.
44 The Convention for the Future of Europe took the view that a relaxation of the test of 
individual concern would be desirable. See Final Report of Discussion Circle CONV 636/03. 
This relaxation was later introduced in Article III-270(4) of the Constitutional Treaty. For a 
detailed account of the alternatives considered by the Discussion Circle, see R Barents, ‘The 
Court of Justice in the Draft Constitution’ [2004] 11Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 121, 130.
45 Koch regards this omission as regrettable, especially because it concerns ‘a provision 
which directly impacts on private parties’ procedural rights’. Koch (n 37) 520.
46 According to Article 289(3) TFEU, a legislative act is an act adopted in accordance with 
a legislative procedure, either the ordinary procedure or a special legislative procedure.
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acts of general application,47 the latter acts can be generally regarded as 
‘regulatory acts’ within the meaning of Article 263(4).48 These acts can 
thus certainly be implementing and delegated regulations adopted un-
der Articles 290 and 291(2) TFEU and possibly also decisions of general 
application.49 It is more doubtful, however, whether ‘regulatory acts’ also 
include regulations that are adopted through a legislative procedure.50
Furthermore, the locus standi of individual applicants is broadened 
only with regard to regulatory acts which do not require implementing 
measures, that is, when the applicant could only obtain access to justice 
by breaching the provisions of the contested measure and invoking its 
invalidity as a defence in criminal or administrative proceedings against 
him before a national court.
Many environmental measures fall outside the scope of the concept 
of a ‘regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures’. 
First of all, a great part of EU environmental measures are adopted 
in the form of directives. These are acts which, regardless of their legisla-
tive or non-legislative nature, by definition entail implementing measures 
and thus will not be included in the measures for which, according to 
Article 263(4) TFEU, individual concern does not need to be proven.
Secondly, even where the environmental measure is adopted by way 
of a decision (which was the case in the Greenpeace and EEB cases dis-
cussed above), the situation is not significantly improved for environmen-
tal NGOs. This is because the new wording of Article 263 TFEU, read in 
conjunction with Article 289(3) TFEU, seems to preclude application to 
the Court against all decisions which were adopted by way of a legislative 
procedure. All decisions which are adopted by legislative procedure con-
stitute ‘legislative acts’, and therefore cannot be challenged under the new 
wording in Article 263 TFEU. Furthermore, in the case of adoption by way 
of a non-legislative procedure, many decisions could still not be challenged 
in court under Article 263 TFEU, because they would either not qualify as 
regulatory acts because of a lack of general application, or because they 
need implementing measures at the EU or Member State level.
Finally, where a regulation is used to issue a measure which has 
an effect on the environment (which was the case in the WWF-UK and 
47 According to Article 290(1) TFEU, ‘a legislative act may delegate to the Commission the 
power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain 
non-essential elements of the legislative act’.
48 C Brown and J Morijn, ‘Comment on Jégo-Quéré’ [2004] 41CML Rev 1639, 1655.
49 Koch (n 37) 519-521.
50 For a further discussion on this topic, see S Balthasar, ‘Locus Standi Rules for Challen-
ges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU’ [2010] 35 EL Rev 
542.
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Autonomous Region of the Azores cases discussed above), the loosening 
of the standing requirements will only take place where the regulation 
is not adopted by legislative procedure and does not entail implemen-
ting measures. However, where regulations and decisions are used in 
the environmental field, they tend to entail a considerable number of 
implementing measures such as the designation of national competent 
authorities, the issuing of permits by national authorities, and the mo-
nitoring of respect for the provisions by the national authorities.51 They 
are therefore normally not directly applicable, but require implementing 
provisions to be adopted by EU institutions or the Member States. 
In conclusion, one could argue that the new wording of Article 263 
TFEU will only affect a small number of measures and actions taken by 
EU institutions or bodies. As the new text only refers to provisions of re-
gulatory acts which do not need implementation measures, it is not likely 
that a significant number of EU measures that affect the environment 
could be challenged under the new provision. The EU courts’ (to date 
limited) interpretation of this provision does not seem to alter this conclu-
sion.
In Arcelor, for example, the applicant challenged a directive establis-
hing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community.52 The General Court argued, among other things, that the 
Directive could not ‘in any event, be regarded as being a regulatory act 
which does not entail implementing measures within the terms of the 
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU’53 because the Member States have 
a broad discretion with regard to implementation of the measure. In this 
ruling, therefore, the accent is not so much on the scope of the concept of 
‘regulatory act’, but rather on the fact that if there are implementing me-
asures, which is bound to be the case with directives, individual concern 
will always have to be shown.
The issue was raised again and became of particular significance in 
Inuit, in which the applicants were seeking the annulment of a regulation 
concerning the trade in seal products and interim measures in the form 
of an order of suspension of the operation of the regulation itself.54 In 
deciding on whether to grant the interim measures requested, the Pre-
sident of the General Court observed that the admissibility of the action 
of annulment could not be excluded, because it was unclear whether the 
regulation at stake would qualify as a ‘regulatory act’, and what the con-
51 Jans (n 9) 485.
52 Case T-16/04 Arcelor v European Parliament and Council [2010] OJ C-100/35.
53 Arcelor (n 52) para 123.
54 Case T-18/10 R Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v European Parliament and Council 
[2010] OJ C-161/41.
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cept of ‘implementing measures’ for the purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU 
entailed.55
5. Conclusion
It is the ECJ itself which has stated, in a certainly less known pa-
ssage of its Plaumann ruling, that ‘[P]rovisions of the Treaty regarding 
the right of action of interested parties must not be interpreted restric-
tively … the Treaty being silent on this point, a limitation in this respect 
may not be presumed’.56 The analysis carried out above shows, however, 
that by applying the restrictive Plaumann test to the actions brought by 
environmental NGOs, the European courts have, to date, significantly 
curtailed access to justice to challenge EU measures affecting the envi-
ronment. In fact, in none of the cases brought at the European level have 
environmental NGOs ever been granted standing.
It has also been shown that the Lisbon Treaty is unlikely to bring any 
significant change to the current situation, given the scope of the concept 
of ‘regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures’, which 
is not likely to encompass many of the environmental measures which 
could possibly constitute the subject matter of an action for annulment 
brought by NGOs.
This jurisprudence established by the ECJ (coupled with the lack 
of improvements brought by the Lisbon Treaty for environmental NGOs) 
seems to be too strict to meet the criteria of the Aarhus Convention, as 
was also recently established by the Aarhus Compliance Committee in 
its Findings.57 While it is true that none of the cases discussed above was 
initiated after the entry into force of the Aarhus Regulation, it can hardly 
be imagined that, with the entry into force of the Regulation, a dramatic 
change in the case law of the European courts may be expected. On the 
other hand, if the examined jurisprudence of the EU Courts on access to 
55 It must be pointed out that the reasoning of the President is not clear. In paragraph 44, 
it is argued that in the context of the definition of the scope of the concept of ‘regulatory 
act’, ‘as the Parliament and the Council point out, that category of act would probably have 
to be defined in relation to that of “legislative acts”, subject to the particular circumstance, 
in the present case, that Regulation No 1007/2009 was not adopted in accordance with 
the legislative procedure laid down in Article 294 TFEU’. This line of reasoning is not clear, 
given the fact that Regulation No 1007/2009 was adopted in accordance with Article 251 
EC, which is equivalent to Article 294 TFEU, and that this is exactly what the Parliament 
and the Council were arguing, as shown by paragraph 32 of the Order.
56 Plaumann (n 13) Part I.
57 Aarhus Compliance Committee, Findings and Recommendations with regard to Communi-
cation ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) concerning compliance by the European Union, available at 
<http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/CC-32/ece.mp.pp.c.1.2011.4.add.1.edited.
adv%20copy.pdf>.
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justice were to continue, there would be a clear violation of Article 9(2) 
and (3) of the Convention.58
As a different interpretation of ‘individual concern’ is possible and 
does not require any Treaty amendment, it is submitted that the Eu-
ropean Courts should, in order to comply with the Aarhus Convention, 
consider the environmental NGOs which fulfil the criteria for entitlement 
provided by Article 11 of the Aarhus Regulation as being individually 
concerned for the purposes of bringing an annulment action against EU 
measures affecting the environment. Whether the European Court will in 
future interpret Article 263 TFEU more openly remains to be seen.
Should the ECJ not proceed to change the current interpretation of 
the notion of individual concern, two possible scenarios may be envisa-
ged. The first, in principle more cumbersome, way to allow for a broader 
standing of environmental NGOs to challenge EU measures would be 
through a Treaty revision, pursuant to Article 48 TEU, by following the 
ordinary procedure with a convention, or possibly without one should 
the European Council decide that such a convention is not necessary.59 
A paragraph could also be added to Article 263 TFEU to the effect that 
NGOs which fulfil the requirements of Article 11 of the Aarhus Regulation 
do not need to prove individual concern.
Alternatively, one could envisage the creation of a specialised court 
for environmental matters attached to the General Court pursuant to 
Article 257 TFEU. According to this provision, such a specialised court 
would have to be set up through a regulation adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legi-
slative procedure, either upon a proposal of the Commission after consul-
tation with the Court of Justice or at the request of the Court of Justice 
after consultation with the Commission (which seems to be a less likely 
alternative). The establishing regulation would give this specialised court 
jurisdiction for matters falling within the scope of the Aarhus Conventi-
on, and would provide for a right of action for environmental NGOs which 
fulfil the requirements of Article 11 of the Aarhus Regulation.
58 However, it must be pointed out that the Committee noted that it considered ‘with regret 
that the EU Courts, despite the entry into force of the Convention, did not account for the 
fact that the Convention had entered into force’ (n 57) para 87.
59 Pursuant to Article 48(3) TEU, if the European Council adopts by a simple majority a 
decision in favour of examining a Treaty amendment, the President of the European Coun-
cil has to convene a Convention composed of representatives of the national parliaments, 
heads of state or governments of the Member States, the European Parliament and the 
Commission. The Convention shall examine the proposals for amendments and shall adopt 
by consensus a recommendation to a conference of representatives of the governments of 
the Member States.
